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on NATO and the Warsaw Pact, Temple University's Center in Bucharest (Romanian Ministry of National Defense), which
for the Study of Force and Diplomacy, the U.C. Santa Barbara described Romania s efforts to seek independence from the
Center on Cold War Studies, and the University of Virginia's Soviet Union by attempting to ameliorate the Sino-Soviet
Miller Center and History Department. schism. Doug Selvage of the (U.S. Department of State s
On Friday, 31 October, after a gracious welcome from Historian s Office), presented a paper examining the Polish
both James Goldgeier (GWCW) as well as the local hosts of regime s efforts to limit the scope of the Sino-Soviet split but
the conference, represented by Csaba Békés of the Cold also utilize Chinese-Soviet tensions to gain additional lever-
War History Research Center (Budapest), the conference age in its argument with Moscow on foreign policy issues
moved quickly into the first task for the morning: two paper (the possible admittance of Mongolia into the Warsaw Pact
panels on new evidence about the relationship between the in 1963 and the proposed Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty,
socialist countries of Eastern Europe and China. The first in particular). The final paper of the morning was presented
panel, focusing on the pivotal year 1956 and chaired by by David Wolff, who added a fresh perspective on the Sino-
Malcolm Byrne (National Security Archive), led off with a Soviet split with his study of Interkit, the Soviet govern-
presentation by Dr. Sergo Mikoyan. Utilizing his father s mental think-tank set up in 1967 to improve understanding of
personal papers, Dr. Mikoyan outlined Anastas Mikoyan s the Chinese and coordination of China policy within the So-
numerous trips to China, beginning with an intriguing ac- cialist bloc.
count of Mikoyan s first meeting with Mao in February 1949 As both Odd Arne Westad (London School of Econom-
and including tidbits from further contacts with the Chinese ics) and Vladislav Zubok (Temple University) pointed out in
in the mid-1950s through the early 1960s. It is clear that these their comments on the first and second panels respectively,
private papers offer a wealth of new information on the intri- these papers added a level of detail to the inter-bloc relation-
cacies of the Chinese-Soviet relationship during this period. ships in the communist world between the Chinese and the
The participants were left hoping that the documents hinted Soviet bloc, between the East Europeans and the Soviets, as
at in Dr. Mikoyan s paper would be made public in the near well as among the East Europeans themselves. Both com-
future. mentators also highlighted how interrelated all of the events
The next paper, presented by Peter Vamos (Hungarian in the bloc were: both the de-Stalinization efforts begun in
Academy of Sciences), focused more specifically on China s 1956 and the Sino-Soviet split cannot be understood simply
influence on events in Hungary during 1956 and in the nor- through the bilateral relations between countries, but need
malization process following the Hungarian Revolution. Uti- to be seen in the web of relationships between all members of
lizing Hungarian documents from the 1950s and early 1960s, the highly fractured socialist bloc, both East and West. While
he added new but inconclusive evidence on the Chinese it remains difficult to understand the Chinese perspective
influence on the 1 November 1956 Soviet decision to send without further access to Chinese archival sources, utilizing
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COLD WAR INTERNATIONAL HISTORY PROJECT BULLETIN, ISSUE 14/15
East and Central European sources on these two crisis peri- party leader Gheorge Gheorghiu-Dej s role. Rather than con-
ods was clearly beneficial for expanding our understanding centrating on archival study, Lavinia Betea argued, histori-
of the complexity in Cold War intra-bloc relations. ans should spend more time trying to analyze the psychol-
The third panel, chaired by Csaba Békés, explored addi- ogy and personality of leaders. Their discourse is just as
tional new evidence on East-European-Chinese relations dur- important, Betea argued, as the documents found in the ar-
ing the Cold War. Jordan Baev (Cold War Group Bulgaria, chives. Baev rounded up the panel with comments on both
Sofia) discussed joint Soviet and Bulgarian efforts to coun- the papers presented and the topic discussed.
teract Maoist propaganda. Using fresh documents from the The last panel of the day concentrated on the role of the
Communist Party, state, diplomatic and security archives in Warsaw Pact in Asia. The panel was chaired by Gregg
Bulgaria, Baev chronicled Bulgarian policy towards China Brazinsky (GWCW); Hope Harrison commented on the pa-
and Albania at the height of the Sino-Soviet Split. If in the pers. Romanian historian Petre Opris opened the discus-
late 1950s the Chinese-Bulgarian relationship could be de- sion with a presentation of his findings on the Soviet at-
scribed as friendly and open, by the early 1960s Bulgaria s tempts to include Mongolia in the Warsaw Pact in the early
relationship with both China and Albania had drastically de- 1960s. The role of Poland in stonewalling Mongolia s acces-
teriorated. Bulgarian leader Todor Zhivkov implemented this sion in the Warsaw Pact is better known, he argued. Never-
shift in policy, Baev argued, for both foreign policy and inter- theless, documents from the Romanian archives show the
nal party reasons. Mircea Munteanu (GWU/CWIHP) pre- important role that Romania played in preventing the War-
sented a paper on the Romanian attempts first to mediate the saw Pact s expansion to the East and its transformation into
split in 1964 and later exploit it for its own purposes. Seeking a Soviet-led tool. Bernd Schäfer (German Historical Institute
to insulate itself from Moscow s whims, Bucharest chose to Washington) presented a report on the latest finding of the
effectively lean to one side in the Sino-Soviet split, Munteanu Parallel History Project on NATO and the Warsaw Pact (PHP).
argued. The split offered Bucharest an unexpected but much Hershberg presented a paper on the Warsaw Pact and the
needed ally in the communist camp in the form of a vocifer- Sino-Soviet split by Mark Kramer (Harvard University, Davis
ous CCP. Unable, and, more importantly unwilling, to estab- Center) who was unable to attend the conference.
lish a state-to-state alliance with Beijing, Bucharest did enter Chaired by Oldrich Tuma, the first panel on Saturday, 1
into a de facto alliance between the two parties directed against November, centered on East and Central European evidence
the ideological position of the CPSU. In doing so, Bucharest on the Vietnam War. In particular, the panel presented evi-
consistently championed policies directed at preventing the dence on East European attempts to mediate the conflict and
Soviets from establishing control over the Socialist coun- on Sino-Soviet competition during the war. Lorenz Luthi
tries and thus effectively isolating the CCP within the Com- (McGill University) presented The Collapse of Sino-Soviet
munist movement. Polish historian Wanda Jarzabek dis- Party Relations and Its Influence on the Early Vietnam War,
cussed Polish perceptions of China during the later half of 1963-66. The U.S. escalation of the war in Vietnam after the
the 1960s. After the split became open, Polish-Chinese party Gulf of Tonkin incident in early August 1964 was the greatest
relations remained very limited. The Chinese, Jarzabek ar- military challenge to the socialist camp since MacArthur s
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